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David G.  Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
This paper uses international microeconomic data to document the existence 
of an inverse relation between workers’ pay and the local rate of unemploy- 
ment. This relation, or wage curve, is estimated for regions using data for Brit- 
ain, the United States, Canada, Austria, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and Nor- 
way.’ Evidence of an equivalent relation is presented for industries2 using data 
David G. Blanchflower is professor of economics at Dartmouth College and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is also a research associate of the Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics. Andrew J. Oswald is a senior research 
fellow at the London School of Economics. 
This paper draws on work done for a monograph, The Wage  Curve, to be published by the MIT 
Press. Richard Freeman, George Johnson, and Larry Katz provided valuable detailed comments. 
The authors also received suggestions and help from John Abowd, Fran Blau, John Bauer, David 
Card,  Bob Gregory, Alan  Gustman,  Bertil  Holmlund,  Richard  Layard, John  Schmitt, Dennis 
Snower, Bob Topel, and Steve Venti. Prakash Loungani and Lamy Katz generously provided data 
on variables suitable for instrumenting U.S. unemployment. This work was supported by the Eco- 
nomic and Social Research Council (Swindon, U.K.). 
I. Early British results are reported in Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) and Blanchflower, Os- 
wald, and Garrett (1990), which appeal to a bargaining approach without any explicit regional 
modeling. The papers give cross-sectional results for various U.K.  samples and also one small 
U.S. sample (although they cannot control fully for regional fixed effects) and attempt to summa- 
rize previous writings. One notable early paper in this literature is Blackaby and Manning (1987). 
These authors’ later work on the United Kingdom is contained in Blackaby and Manning (1990). 
Jackman, Layard, and Savouri (1991) offer an interesting model and, using British regional data, 
obtain results compatible with those presented here; Blanchflower (1991) provides recent U.K. 
estimates and finds an unemployment elasticity of approximately -0.1  ;  Christofides and Oswald 
(1992) also obtain a similar estimate of approximately -0.08  using longitudinal Canadian contract 
data. A number of other authors have recently tested and found some support for wage curves: 
these include Edin, Holmlund, and Ostros (1992) for Sweden, Groot, Mekkeholt, and Oosterbeek 
(1992) for Holland, and Freeman (1990), Katz and Krueger (1991a, 1991b). and Blanchflower and 
Lynch (1994) for the United States. Topel (1986) also studies wage determination in geographic 
labor markets but examines effects from variables such as the rate of change of employment rather 
than from the level of  unemployment. Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) find a role for unemploy- 
ment in industry wage equations for various countries. 
2. There is a related literature using micro data that tests for effects from the aggregate level of 
unemployment. This includes Bils (1985) and Nickell and Wadhwani (1990). Using PSID and 
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for Korea and Germany (where lack of regional data prevents the same exercise 
as for the other nations) and for the United States. The estimates suggest that, 
on average, the unemployment elasticity of pay is approximately -0.1,  which 
implies that a doubling of unemployment leads to a fall in the level of the wage 
by  10 per~ent.~  The empirical work can be viewed as an attempt to trace out 
the supply half of the scissors that describes labor market equilibrium. 
One way to interpret this paper is to see it as establishing, in an atheoretical 
way,  a statistical fact or “law” about labor markets in many countries. High 
unemployment within a region or an industry is associated, ceteris paribus, 
with low wages. The relation between the two takes the form of a convex curve 
with a negative gradient. This curve’s structure seems to be qualitatively, and 
often quantitatively, the same across countries. For example, the estimated re- 
sponsiveness  of  pay  to  unemployment  is  similar  in the  United  States and 
Britain. 
The paper’s evidence for a wage curve also raises theoretical questions. The 
original empirical research project began in 1987, as an attempt to apply union 
bargaining models to British cross-sectional  data, and gradually took on an 
international flavor (as it became clear that the main finding held more gener- 
ally). The original concern was to go beyond time-series methods in order to 
provide a cross-sectional  approach to the calculation  of  the unemployment 
elasticity of pay. 
During the years of this project, theoretical macroeconomics has begun to 
change. A generation of models has sprung up in which a wage curve (in this 
paper’s terminology) is the primary distinguishing feature. The exact history 
of this research current is discussed in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) 
and  Phelps  (1992).  Influential  contributions  include  Shapiro  and  Stiglitz 
(1984), Layard and Nickel1 (1986), and the Scandinavian Journal of Econom- 
ics symposium issue “Unemployment-Inflation Trade-offs in Europe” (1990). 
A textbook treatment is contained in Carlin and Soskice (1990). The gist of 
all this work is that, in the 1980s, “a surrogate employment supply curve, or 
equilibrium wage curve, was born” (Phelps 1992, 1004).  A review by Michael 
Woodford (1992, 396) describes the new theories succinctly: ‘All of these im- 
ply that labor market equilibrium (ie. a state in which expectations are fulfilled 
and transacting parties correctly understand the aggregate state of  the econ- 
omy) lies at the intersection of the derived labor demand curve with a surrogate 
labor supply curve that lies to the left of, and is flatter than, the true Marshallian 
labor supply curve.” A recent overview by Lindbeck (1992) adopts the same 
approach and uses the assumption that there is a Layard-Nickel1  “wage-setting 
curve,” different from conventional atomistic supply, that  slopes upward in 
CPS data, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) argue that wages depend, not on current labor market 
conditions, but on aggregate and industry unemployment rates in earlier time periods when unem- 
ployment was low. 
3. The early survey by  Oswald (1986) argued that an unemployment elasticity of  -0.1  was 
emerging consistently from different kinds of aggregated and disaggregated evidence. 147  International Wage Curves 
real-wage/employment space. Another new model in which a central part is 
played by  the same general form of  wage equation is the fairness approach 
described in Akerlof and Yellen (1  990). 
As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Layard and Nickell (1986) make clear, 
the novel aspect of  these models is not their assumptions about labor demand, 
which are the standard ones, but rather that the models replace the conventional 
labor supply curve with a wage-fixing  function. This allows the theories to 
explain, or at least to be consistent with, both involuntary unemployment and 
the paradoxical fact that real wages  fluctuate  little over the cycle while the 
long-run supply of workers appears to be close to vertical. 
There are at least two reasons to predict that high unemployment will tend 
to lead to low pay. The first is that workers have low bargaining power when 
surrounded by extreme levels of joblessness. This rationale fits well with union 
and other bargaining theories and, more generally, with Marxist accounts of 
the role of the reserve army of the unemployed. The second follows efficiency 
wage models in stressing the role of unemployment as a motivator. In a boom- 
ing labor market, firms may have to pay well to ensure that individual workers, 
who know that there are many other jobs open to them, exert enough effort 
at work. 
Although  primarily  empirical,  the  paper’s  secondary  purpose  is to write 
down a multiregion efficiency wage model that is consistent with, and offers a 
possible conceptual framework for the analysis of, the empirical patterns found 
in the international data. According to this model, even when workers are free 
to migrate between regions, the contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation 
between pay and unemployment will be negative rather than, as is sometimes 
asserted, positive. Within  this framework, the paper’s estimated wage curve 
corresponds to a no-shirking condition of  the kind  in, for example, Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (  1984).4 
4.1  Background 
Three literatures lie behind the empirical work reported in the paper. The 
oldest is the extensive research into Phillips curves stemming from Phillips 
(1958). Although similar in its broad concern with the macroeconomic relation 
between aggregate joblessness  and wage setting, the present paper does not 
study the rate of wage inflation or purport to uncover a disequilibrium adjust- 
ment mechanism. It is probably not usefully thought of as an attempt to esti- 
mate quasi Phillips curves. A second and related strand of research is the writ- 
ings of  authors such as Layard and Nickell (1986) and, before them, Sargan 
([  19641 1984) who use time-series data to estimate the effect of the aggregate 
unemployment rate on the aggregate level of wages. The present paper can be 
4.  The theoretical papers by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Bowles (1985). and Phelps (1990) also 
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seen as an attempt to employ microeconomic data to look for what might be 
described as a cross-sectional version of this relation. The third literature on 
which the paper builds is the US. work initiated by Harris and Todaro (1970) 
and Hall (1970, 1972) and continued by Adams (1985), Browne (1978), Mar- 
ston (1985),  and Reza (1978). This helped establish the current conventional 
wisdom that, by  a compensating-differential argument, wages and unemploy- 
ment are positively correlated across geographic areas. The paper tries to show 
that some aspects of that conventional wisdom are incorrect. 
The paper outlines an efficiency wage model of an economy with multiple 
regions. This model was developed, after examination of the data, as an attempt 
to find a theoretical structure that is internally theoretically consistent and fits 
the statistical facts. The present paper does not, and could not, claim that there 
exist no other models that might be consistent with the estimated wage curves. 
Other possibilities may include the standard competitive model, contract the- 
ory, search theory, and bargaining models. However, competitive theory does 
not seem to offer a natural way to explain the patterns in the data because it 
predicts that unemployment-if  defined as a disequilibrium surplus of labor 
supply over demand-will  be positively associated with the level of wages. A 
competitive interpretation would require that later regressions somehow iden- 
tify a labor supply curve rather than an unemployment effect on wages, and 
tests reported in a forthcoming monograph shed doubt on such an interpreta- 
tion. The explanatory power of  labor supply and participation variables, for 
example, is weak. Labor contract theory and search theory also have difficulty 
generating the correct prediction of  a negative correlation between pay  and 
joblessness. A bargaining framework can give the correct general kind of pre- 
diction, although the question of  how  a multiregion model  might be  con- 
structed has hardly been considered in the literature, but it will not be pursued 
here. This is partly because one original intention of the paper was to analyze 
the economy of the United States, where unionism is relatively unimportant, 
and where choosing a bargaining framework seems correspondingly less ap- 
propriate (although not impossible). While important, these issues are taken up 
more fully in a future monograph and are not the primary focus of the paper. 
A central question is that of how the identification of a wage equation is to 
be achieved if the labor market is to be thought of  as a pair of simultaneous 
equations. At the broadest level, there appear to be three possibilities. First, 
and most restrictive, the wage  curve would be identified if  all the random 
shocks occur on the demand side, namely, through movements in demand shift 
variables. This is not a plausible exact condition, but it might hold in an ap- 
proximate way  if  demand shocks are quantitatively dominant. Second, the 
wage function would be identified if the system were appropriately recursive. 
If  the pay equation includes lagged unemployment, for example, rather than 
the contemporaneous level of joblessness, it may be sufficient to treat unem- 
ployment as a predetermined variable in the wage equation. Third, if  there 
exist suitable variables that enter the unemployment equation but not the wage 149  International Wage Curves 
equation, then the wage curve could be estimated by conventional instrumental 
variable methods. If none of these is feasible, OLS estimation is likely to bias 
upward the coefficient  on unemployment in the wage equation, which will 
make it harder to obtain a significant negative unemployment coefficient in a 
wage equation. 
This project considered the three possibles routes to the identification of the 
wage equation described above. The most attractive theoretically is the third 
method, but a practical difficulty is that of finding suitable instruments. Instru- 
menting unemployment in the U.S. case, for example, by using regional federal 
expenditure and weather variables  makes no difference to the results found 
with OLS. Instrumenting with military spending and compositional variables 
(these were generously provided by Larry Katz) increases the estimated unem- 
ployment elasticity very marginally. Instrumental variable estimation  has to 
date not changed any of the research project’s conclusions. For this practical 
reason, the approach taken throughout the paper will be to present OLS results 
and to defer more detailed discussion of simultaneity to a future monograph. 
In some cases, the estimated equations here could be seen as relying on lags 
for identification. 
An efficiency wage framework suggests that regions with different unem- 
ployment benefit levels may have “no-shirking conditions” that differ by a ver- 
tical intercept term. This implies that an important addition to wage equations 
will be controls for regional fixed effects. Such controls will also capture innate 
differences in the regions’ probability distributions of demand shocks. Without 
including regional  fixed-effect terms, an estimated wage equation will tend 
incorrectly to conflate a no-shirking condition with a Harris and Todaro (1970) 
zero-migration condition. The latter, loosely speaking, suggests that, in a cross 
section, the expected unemployment rate may be positively correlated with the 
expected wage. The former, by  contrast, requires that the contemporaneous 
levels of pay and unemployment be negatively correlated. The model given at 
the end of the paper shows that these are not incompatible. 
4.2  Empirical Evidence for International Wage Curves 
Earnings equations were estimated on pooled cross-sectional data for a set 
of ten countries. Although theory implicitly describes real-wage determination, 
no consistent regional price data exist for the set of countries, so it is necessary 
to assume that regional CPI differences are adequately captured by using year 
and geographic dummies. This method will go wrong only when there are 
important changes in the relative structure of regions’ product prices, which 
arbitrage  should go some way  toward preventing.  Moreover, Blackaby  and 
Manning (1990) have shown that, in a U.K. sample, the inclusion of regional 
price  deflators makes  no  substantive  difference to  the  existence of  a wage 
curve, and the industry wage curves that are successfully estimated later in this 
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price deflators are needed. For these reasons, the lack of  geographic prices 
may not be an insurmountable difficulty. 
In most of the regression  equations, unemployment  at a regional level is 
included as an explanatory variable within an otherwise conventional form of 
log earnings equation. Where geographic codes are missing, however, industry 
unemployment rates are used. Wherever possible, regional and industry dum- 
mies are included in the regressions to capture the innate differences among 
areas. These may correspond to controls for the different utility levels available 
to those without work: regional unemployment benefit plays the role of a verti- 
cal shift variable in the wage curve (or no-shirking) equation. Because of the 
large number of  data sets and space restrictions, no attempt is made here to 
explain in full the construction of different variables across nations or to give 
a complete description of the means and summary  statistic^.^ Details are avail- 
able from the authors and in a future monograph. Efforts have been  taken, 
however, to keep the general specifications as similar as possible across the 
international data sets. Moreover, the estimated unemployment elasticities are 
not  sensitive to either the exact choice of  personal control variables  or the 
precise form of the dependent variable (i.e., annual, monthly, weekly, or hourly 
wages or earnings). 
Results for Great Britain begin in table 4.1, which uses the British Social 
Attitudes  (BSA) surveys of  1983-87  and 1989-91  (there was  no survey in 
1988). Column 1 of table 4.1 estimates a cross-sectional log earnings equation, 
with approximately eighty-one hundred observations, in which regional unem- 
ployment is entered as an explanatory variable. The wage equation explains 
approximately three-quarters of the variance of pay. It includes sets of personal 
variables and of year and industry dummy variables. The log of regional unem- 
ployment (here there are eleven regions by eight years of data) enters in column 
1 with a coefficient of  -0.15.  Allowing for a set of regional dummies reduces 
this to approximately -0.11  in column 2. Six other regressions (cols. 3-8)  are 
presented:  these disaggregate by  union and nonunion  status and by  private- 
sector status. The results suggest that the unemployment elasticity of wages is 
higher in the nonunion sector and in the private sector. For example, the point 
elasticity in the nonunion column 4 regression is -0.19,  whereas that in the 
union column 3 regression is -0.05.  Table 4.2 reveals similar findings, using 
the General Household Survey (GHS), for the United Kingdom between 1973 
and  1977. Including regional dummies to control for fixed effects within re- 
gions, the unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated in column 2 at approxi- 
mately -0.09.  It makes little difference whether hourly or weekly earnings are 
used as the dependent variable: compare columns 2 and 4 of table 4.2. 
To  guard against the possibility  that the standard errors in these kinds of 
equations are artificially small (a possibility suggested in a series of theoretical 
5. Descriptions of some of these data sets are available in Blanchflower (1991), Blanchflower 
and Freeman (1992), and Blanchflower and Oswald (1989, 1994). Table 4.1  U.K. Log Earnings Equation with Unemployment  Variable (the U.K. wage curve), 1983-87 and 1989-91 
All Employees  Private-Sector Employees 
Union  Nonunion  Union  Nonunion 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Log unemployment (U,)  -.I50  -.I08  -.051  -.I90  -  .207  -.I35  -  .093  -.I82 
(7.89)  (3.53)  (1.38)  (3.55)  (8.66)  (3.47)  (1.74)  (3.27) 
Regional dummies (10)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  .732  ,737  .I34  .737  .73  1  ,736  .727  ,733 
F  356.43  3 19.29  201.33  125.11  233.55  209.56  96.18  114.56 
DF  8,125  8,116  5,016  3,031  5,336  5,948  2,430  2,828 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey Series. 
Nore: Unless stated otherwise, the following control variables were included: (1) 41 industry dummies, (2) LO regional dummies, (3) marital status dummies, (4) nonman- 
ual dummy, (5)  supervisor dummy, (6) 2 union dummies, (7) gender dummy, (8) experience and its square, (9) years of schooling, (10) whether employment is expected 
to rise at the workplace dummy, (1 1) unemployed in previous 5 years dummy, (12) 7 year dummies plus a constant. The dependent variable is the natural log of gross 
annual earnings. U,  is the natural log of the regional unemployment rate. Union status is determined on the basis of union recognition at the workplace. t-statistics are 
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Table 4.2  The U.K. Wage Curve, 1973-77 
Weekly Earnings  Hourly Earnings 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
u,  -  ,070 
(10.47) 
Regional dummies (10)  No 
Constant  2.890 
(74.01) 
17.2  ,598 
DF  60,486 
F  1,158.21 
















-  ,088 
(5.08) 
Yes 





Source: General Household Survey Series 
Note: In all cases, there are 60,565 observations. Unless stated otherwise, the following control 
variables were included: (1) 24 industry dummies, (2) 10 regional dummies, (3) 5 marital status 
dummies, (4) 17 qualification dummies,  (5) 18 occupation dummies, (6) 4 year dummies, (7) 
gender dummy, (8) experience and its square, (9)  part-time dummy. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of  gross earnings. U,  is the natural log of the regional unemployment rate. f-statistics 
are given in parentheses. 
econometrics papers by Moulton [1986, 1987, 19901, Greenwald [1983], and 
Kloek  [1981]), the means of  the dependent variable and every independent 
variable in each regiodyear cell were calculated. Table 4.3 reports the results 
of  reestimating  the BSA regressions using these regional cell means, rather 
than the individual data themselves, as observations. This satisfies Moulton’s 
condition that the level of aggregation should be the same on both sides of the 
regression equation. Column 2 of table 4.3 shows that, controlling for regional 
dummies, the  coefficient on  the log of  unemployment  is  -0.12,  with  a  t- 
statistic of  1.8. Including a lagged dependent variable raises the t very slightly. 
Although  the  estimate  of  the  quantitative  effect of  unemployment  on  pay 
hardly changes between tables 4.1 and 4.3, therefore, the level of  statistical 
significance looks considerably lower in the latter. The experiments reported 
in columns 4-7  suggest that  current unemployment  has  greater  statistical 
power than the lagged rate of unemployment, which is generally weak in this 
data set. 
US.  results are given in table 4.4, using the March Current Population Sur- 
veys (CPSs) from 1964 to 1988, which provides a larger sample than is avail- 
able for other countries.6 The unemployment  and earnings data used in the 
6. After excluding the self-employed and those working without pay, the separate files for each 
of the years 1964-88  were pooled, giving a data file of over 1.5 million cases. The wage sample 
includes both full- and part-time workers. Industry and regional unemployment rates were mapped 
onto the data file for the period 1963-87.  Because of changes in industrial classification over the 
period in question, it  was possible uniquely to distinguish only forty-four continuous industry 
groupings that could be allocated unemployment rates. Analogously, because of changes in the 
way regions are defined in the 1968-75  CPS, it is possible to identify only twenty-one continuous 153  International Wage Curves 
Table 4.3  The U.K. Regional Wage Curve, 1983-91 
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Source: British Social Attitudes Survey Series. 
Note: All equations include the same set of controls as included in table 4.1. Because of a shortage 
of degrees of freedom, industry controls are not included. The dependent variable is log of  gross 
annual earnings. All unemployment rates and the dependent variable (annual income) are in natu- 
ral logarithms. There are 10 regional dummies. All variables, including the dependent variable, are 
measured as the mean of all observations in a yeadregion cell. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
subsequent regressions relate to the respondent's  labor market behavior in the 
year preceding  the date of  interview. When estimating an earnings equation 
using, for example, the March 1987 CPS, regional unemployment and industry 
unemployment rates are mapped in for 1986. In what follows, years relate to 
the year preceding the survey rather than to the date of the survey. In the above 
case, for example, estimates from the 1987 CPS would be recorded as being 
for 1986. The equations in table 4.4 are estimated on regional cell means (de- 
rived from the full sample of approximately  1.5 million  observations), and, 
because there are twenty-one regions times twenty-five years, the equations 
have between 380 and 450 degrees of freedom. These twenty-one regions are 
each large areas of the United States, such as New York State (see table 4.4), 
and this choice of aggregation was necessitated by changes in data collection 
through the period. The included personal control variables,  such as experi- 
ence, schooling, and marital status, are calculated as regional cell means. All 
the regressions incorporate full sets of (twenty-four) year dummies and (forty- 
regional groups over the twenty-five-year period. These area groupings are used to derive the 
regional dummies that we include in our subsequent regressions. For the 1964-67  and 1976-88 
CPSs, unemployment rates are mapped in at the state level. The other years use somewhat broader 
area definitions. In both cases, there are over one thousand separate unemployment observations. 154  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
Table 4.4  The U.S. Regional Wage Curve, 1963-87 
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Source: Current Population Surveys, March tapes. 
Nore: All equations include full sets of year dummies, region dummies (20), industry dummies (43), plus 
controls for (1) experience and its square, (2) years of schooling, (3) 4 marital status dummies, (4) 2 race 
dummies, (5) private-sector dummy, (6) part-time dummy. All unemployment rates and the dependent 
variable (annual income) are in natural logarithms. All variables, including the dependent variable, are 
measured as the mean of all observations in a yearkegion cell. The following 21 regional groupings had 
to be used: (1) Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island; (2) Connecticut; (3) New 
York; (4) New Jersey; (5) Pennsylvania; (6) Ohio; (7) Indiana; (8) Illinois; (9) Michigan, Wisconsin; (10) 
Minnesota, Missouri, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas; (1  1) Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, West Virginia; (12) Washington, D.C.; (13) North  Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia; (14) Flor- 
ida; (15) Kentucky, Tennessee; (16) Alabama, Mississippi; (17) Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma; (18) 
Texas; (19) Montana, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada; (20) California; 
(21 ) Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii. f-statistics are given in parentheses. 
three)  industry  dummies.  Unemployment  and  earnings are in  natural  loga- 
rithms. Some results for the regressions on individual data, with a total sample 
of approximately 1.5 million observations, are discussed later. 
Table 4.4 shows that the United States has a wage curve and that the elastic- 
ity of the curve is not greatly different from that in Britain. Column 1 of  table 
4.4 reveals a significant  and negative effect from regional unemployment: a 
small coefficient of approximately -  0.03 is estimated. Once regional dummies 
are included, however, this rises in absolute value to approximately  -0.05  in 
column 2 of table 4.4 and, as a long-run equilibrium value, to approximately 
-0.07  in column 3. The significance of the lagged dependent variable in table 
4.4 indicates that wages are mildly autoregressive, with a coefficient on the log 
of wages a year ago of approximately 0.25. Column 4 incorporates unemploy- 
ment variables for both the current year and the previous year, and the implied 
long-run  unemployment  elasticity  of  pay  is  then  equal  to  approximately 
-0.08. 
Columns 6 and 7 of table 4.4 show evidence of fairly long lags, of up to two 
years, from the level of regional unemployment to wages. The significance in 155  International Wage Curves 
column 7 (table 4.4) of  unemployment two years ago might be taken as evi- 
dence that movements in joblessness are the cause of, and not predominantly 
caused by, movements in pay. This argument is based on the idea that unem- 
ployment can be treated in  such an equation as predetermined  and that this 
helps circumvent  simultaneity problems.  Lags were considerably  weaker in 
the British regressions. 
The same form of exercise, but on U.S. state data from the period 1979-87, 
is reported as table 4.5. Estimation on cell means now provides 390 degrees of 
freedom. The first point to be made in this case is that-as  in column  1 of 
table 4.5-when  regional fixed effects are ignored there is little or no sign of 
a negative effect of joblessness on pay. This is effectively the form of inquiry 
undertaken  by  Hall (1970) and suggests one reason  why his results,  which 
were on a small sample of  U.S. cities, reveal no negative slope. To  get the 
negative gradient, column 2 of table 4.5 includes fifty state dummies, and the 
coefficient on unemployment changes to -0.07  with a t-statistic of 7.3. 
Columns 3-8  of table 4.5 include various permutations of lagged unemploy- 
ment and wage variables. The implied unemployment elasticity of pay in these 
equations is consistently close to approximately -0.08.  The sixth and seventh 
columns of  table 4.5 reveal that the results are robust to the replacement of 
current unemployment by lagged unemployment. 
Further CPS experiments are given in table 4.6. Here the regression is esti- 
Table 4.5  The U.S. State Wage Curve, 1979-87 
w,-  I 
State 
Constant  6.697 
(20.56) 
R2  ,938 
F  110.32 
DF  390 
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Source: Current Population Surveys, March tapes. 
Note: All equations include full sets of year dummies, 50 state dummies (including the District of Colum- 
bia), industry dummies (43), plus controls for (1) experience and its square, (2) years of schooling, (3) 4 
marital status dummies, (4) 2 race dummies, (5) private-sector dummy, (6) part-time dummy. All unem- 
ployment rates and the dependent variable (annual income) are in natural logarithms. All variables, includ- 
ing the dependent variable, are measured as the mean of all observations in a yeadstate cell. t-statistics 
are given in parentheses. Table 4.6  The U.S. Wage Curve, 1963-87 
Industry (I  -.016 
(  1.39) 
Regional (I  ,013 
Regional dummies  No 
Constant  5.985 
(195.64) 
82  ,540 
F  5,061.45 
N  263,133 
(  1 .a) 
-.019 
(1.68) 
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Source: Current Population Surveys, March tapes. 
Note; All equations include full sets of year dummies and industry dummies (43) plus controls for (1) experience and its square, (2) years of schooling, (3) 4 marital 
status dummies, (4) two race dummies, (5) private-sector dummy, (6) par-time dummy. All unemployment rates and the dependent variable (annual income) are in 
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mated on the full micro sample without use of cell means, and both industry 
and regional unemployment rates-again  in logarithms-are  entered together 
as explanatory variables. For the full sample of  1963-87  (cols. 7-9  of  table 
4.6), when industry and regional dummies are included, the industry unem- 
ployment elasticity of pay and the regional unemployment elasticity of pay are 
each approximately -0.1. 
Columns 1-6  of table 4.6 break the time period into different samples as a 
way  of  assessing the robustness and stability of the estimates. Column 3 of 
table 4.6 is especially interesting because it obtains, for the period  1969-78, 
the Hall (1970) result that wages and unemployment are positively correlated 
across regions. Column 4, however, reveals that the introduction of  regional 
dummies turns an unemployment coefficient of  +0.106 into one of  -0.045. 
Thus, it is omitted regional fixed effects that appear, in this period, to  be re- 
sponsible for the Hall-style finding of a positive relation between a regional 
wage and regional unemployment. With regional dummies included in the re- 
gressions, the regional unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated at -0.08 
in 1963-68,  -0.05  in  1969-78,  and -0.15  in 1979-87.  The estimate is -0.1 
overall in column 8. It is not easy to understand these variations; they will need 
eventually to be explained. Nevertheless, the wage curve has a persistently 
negative gradient and one centered at approximately -0.1.  Column 9 suggests 
that industry and regional unemployment are orthogonal to one another. 
Two other points are worth noting. First, a series of U.S. wage equations 
was estimated for the period 1979-87  replacing regional dummies with “per- 
manent” regional unemployment rates. This permanent unemployment  vari- 
able was defined as average state unemployment for the period  1960-88. As 
expected, this variable enters positively and significantly. Although its inclu- 
sion  improves the  performance  of  the  regional  unemployment  variable,  it 
significantly worsens the overall fit of the equation compared with the speci- 
fication including regional dummies. Second, a possible objection to noncom- 
petitive interpretations of the estimated wage-unemployment correlation is that 
unemployment here could be acting as a mismeasured variable for a conven- 
tional labor supply curve. In order to test for such a possibility, regressions for 
the United States were estimated  that included the labor force participation 
rate and, as an alternative, the employment/population ratio. These regressions 
were estimated on state means for the period  1979-87. When included with 
the  state  unemployment  rate,  these  variables  were  typically  insignificant, 
whereas the coefficient on the unemployment  variable remained  significant 
and of the same size as above. Further details on these issues are available on 
request from the authors. 
Separate union  and  nonunion  wage curves are estimated  for the United 
States in tables 4.7 and 4.8. Because of data restrictions, it is necessary to use 
the March CPSs from 1983 to 1988. As was true in the U.K. case, the union 
sector of the United States appears to have a less elastic wage curve than the 
nonunion sector. The coefficient on regional log U is, in table 4.7, approxi- Table 4.7  Union and Nonunion Wage Curves, United States, 1982-87 
All  Union  Nonunion 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
CJ, industry 
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Source: Current Population Surveys, March tapes. 
Note:  All equations include full sets of  year, state (50).  and industry variables (43) plus controls 
for (1) experience and its square, (2) years of schooling, (3) 4 marital status variables, (4) two race 
variables, (5)  private sector, (6) part-time status. All unemployment rates and the dependent van- 
able (annual income) are in natural logarithms. t-statistics are given in parentheses. N.A. = not 
available. 
Table 4.8  Union and Nonunion Wage Curves, United States, 1982-87 
Private Sector  Public Sector 
All  Union  Nonunion  All  Union  Nonunion 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
U,  industry 
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Source: Current Population Surveys, March tapes 
Nore: All equations include full sets of  year, state (50),  and industry variables (43) plus controls for (I) 
experience and its square, (2) years of  schooling, (3) 4 marital status variables, (4)  two race variables, (5) 
private sector, (6) part-time status. All unemployment rates and the dependent variable (annual income) 
are in natural logarithms. r-statistics are in parentheses. N.A. = not available. 159  International Wage Curves 
Table 4.9  Public-Sector  Wage Curves, United States, 1982-87 
Federal  Local  State 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
U,  industry 










































Source; Current Population Surveys, March tapes 
Nore: All equations include full sets of year, state (50), and industry variables (43) plus controls 
for (I)  experience and its square, (2) years of  schooling, (3) 4 marital status variables, (4) two race 
variables, (5) private sector, (6) part-time status. All unemployment rates and the dependent vari- 
able (annual income) are in natural logarithms. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
mately  -0.07  (poorly determined) in union employment and  -0.12  in non- 
union employment. The publidprivate-sector distinction is examined in tables 
4.8 and 4.9. Columns 1 and 4 of table 4.8 suggest that wages are a little more 
responsive to regional unemployment in the private than in the public sector. 
Once again, the union sector has a less elastic wage curve. The results reported 
in table 4.9 are more dramatic (similar findings are given by Katz and Krueger 
[  1991al);  they show that federal sector employees’ pay is effectively indepen- 
dent of regional unemployment, with the result that the wage curve is flat. 
Although it is not possible to present results in detail, wage curve estimates 
for Canada, South Korea, Austria, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, and 
Germany are summarized in brief form in table 4.10. These use data sets of 
varying sizes and types (most come from the International Social Survey Pro- 
gramme) but give estimates that are similar. Controlling for region or industry 
fixed effects, estimates of the unemployment elasticity of wages are distributed 
around -0.1.  They vary from a low of -0.05  for Korea’s unemployment elas- 
ticity to a high of -0.12  for Austria’s and Holland’s, which might be interpre- 
ted as showing that countries do not differ  markedly. The reported results are 
based  on  earnings  equations  of  an  otherwise  conventional  cross-sectional 
kind-the  exact specification used does not appear to affect the key findings- 
into which the log of the unemployment rate has been added. Details of these 
specifications are available from the authors. 160  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
Table 4.10  International Wage Curves 
Dependent  Coefficient  Fixed 
Country  Variable  Data Set  on Log U  t-statistic  Effects  N 
1. Canada 
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Nore: Log U is defined as an area unemployment rate at various levels of disaggregation in different 
countries. Where indicated by  an asterisk, unemployment is measured at the industry level. The 
dependent variable is in natural logarithms. In all cases, personal variables are included as controls 
(i.e., gender, race, age, schooling, etc.). 
4.3  Interpreting the Data 
A downward-sloping wage curve is observed in what appears to be a robust 
way, across various nations, in these microeconomic data sets. The next ques- 
tions to be tackled are those of  why this occurs, of what it implies for labor 
economics and macroeconomics, and eventually of what it means for govern- 
ment policy. One way to start is to try to write down a model that is internally 
consistent and makes the correct predictions  about the correlation  visible in 
the data. 
An  intuitive  objection to  the  empirical  results  is  that  the  wage-unem- 
ployment correlation should-by  an argument based on compensating differ- 161  International Wage Curves 
entials-be  positive rather than negative. A milder version of such a view is 
that, at best, the estimated wage curves are likely to be a mixture of downward- 
and upward-sloping functions and thus that there is an unresolved simultaneity 
problem. According to this point of view, the estimates conflate the positive 
Harris-Todaro gradient and the negative gradient of a macroeconomic  model 
such as efficiency wage theory. 
This section sets out a model in which a downward-sloping wage curve is 
derived from optimizing behavior. The reason for the negative gradient is that 
unemployment frightens workers and that, in consequence, firms find that, in 
recessions, it is feasible to pay their employees less well. The model is con- 
structed in such a way in that, contrary to Harris and Todaro (1970), wages and 
unemployment are negatively rather than positively related. To understand why 
the upward-sloping  Harris-Todaro relation is misleading, it is necessary to re- 
call that, in reality, migration is a costly process that takes place in a world 
with random demand shocks. 
The theoretical framework allows workers to migrate across regions but as- 
sumes that it is not possible to do so instantly. Unemployed individuals do not 
immediately attempt to migrate: they migrate only if one region offers a better 
expected utility than another. This realistic assumption of costly, rational, far- 
sighted migration decisions effectively decouples current pay and current un- 
employment and so bypasses the positive gradient of  the Harris-Todaro rela- 
tion. A high wage in the current period need not be accompanied in that period 
by high unemployment; pay and unemployment are positively related (at most) 
only in expected or long-run terms. 
One version of the model goes further: it shows that regions that differ only 
in nonpecuniary  attractions may have the same wage curve and nothing that 
corresponds  to  a visible  positive  wage-unemployment relation.  This is pos- 
sible, for example, if one region is inherently attractive and, to ensure consis- 
tency  with  a zero-migration  equilibrium,  therefore  offers both  low pay  and 
high unemployment. Another region, say, pays well and has low unemployment 
but is an inherently unattractive place. The result is a negatively inclined wage 
function even in long-run equilibrium. 
Consider an economy consisting of two regions. The following assumptions 
are made about region  1 and, with small modifications, about region 2: 
Assumption 4.1. Assume that workers are risk neutral and get utility from in- 
come and disutility from effort. Define the wage as w and the level of on-the- 
job effort as e. Assume that utility equals the difference between income and 
effort so that (pecuniary) utility is 
u=w-e. 
Assumption 4.2. Assume that effort at work, e, is a fixed number determined 
by technology but that individual employees can decide to “shirk” and exert 
zero effort. If undetected by the firm, these individuals earn wage w and have 162  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
e = 0 so that u = w. They are then better off  than employees who provide 
eff~rt.~ 
Assumption 4.3.  An individual who shirks runs the risk of being detected. Des- 
ignate as 6 the probability of successfully shirking, that is, of escaping detec- 
tion. Assume that anyone caught shirking is fired and has then to find work 
elsewhere (at required effort e).  Let the expected utility of a fired worker be W. 
Define it 
W = (w -  e) a(U) + b[l -  a(U)] 
This is a convex combination of w -  e, the utility from working at the required 
effort level, and of b, which is defined as the income value of unemployment 
benefit plus leisure. The function a(U) measures the probability  of  finding 
work and how that is affected by the level of unemployment, U, prevailing in 
the local labor market. 
Assumption 4.4.  Assume that there is a constant rate of breakup, I; of firms. In 
steady-state equilibrium, total new hires in the local economy are a(l -  n), 
where 1 is population, n is employment, and 
m = a(/  -  n). 




This defines a function a(U)  with derivatives 
2r 
u3 
a"(U) = -  > 0. 
Thus, the probability of  finding a job, a,  is a convex function of unemploy- 
ment, U. 
Assumption 4.5. Equivalent conditions hold in the second region. The wage 
there is w,  and the level of unemployment benefit is p. The unemployment rate 
in the second region is p. 
Assumption 4.6. The second region differs from the first in that both workers 
and nonworkers enjoy a nonpecuniary benefit, +, from living in the region. 
7. George Johnson, our discussant, raised the issue of whether this discreteness assumption, of 
only two effort levels, is necessary to obtain a wage curve. It is not: all that is needed, intuitively, 
is that workers be frightened by  high unemployment. For example, using a version of efficiency 
wage theory, Phelps (1990, 1992) derives wage curves with a continuous effort function. 163  International Wage Curves 
Their utility is thus u = w -  e + + when working and u = P + +  when unem- 
ployed. 
Assumption 4.7. Each region is affected by  shocks to the demand for labor. The 
shock variable is denoted s in region 1, with a density function g(s). The shock 
variable in region 2 is u, with density of h(u). 
Assumption 4.8. Workers are free, between periods, to choose to live in which- 
ever region they prefer. They cannot migrate during a period. 
The assumptions given above describe a form of efficiency wage model. The 
model's key characteristic is that employers must pay a wage that is sufficiently 
high to induce employees not to shirk. In equilibrium, workers must be behav- 
ing optimally in their effort decisions, and firms must be behaving optimally 
in their wage setting. Regions differ in their nonpecuniary attractions: one of 
the two is a nicer place to live than the other. Excluding degenerate equilibria, 
however, each region must offer workers the same level of  expected utility. 
This condition defines a zero-migration equilibrium. 
A number of results can be proved. 
Proposition 4.1. Each region has a downward-sloping convex wage curve. If 
both regions have the same level of unemployment benefit (so b = P).  they have 
a common wage curve given by the equation 
ProoJ: For a no-shirking equilibrium, the expected utility from not shirking 
must equal that from shirking. Thus, in region 1, 
(1)  w -  e = 8w + (1 -  8){(w -  e)  a(U) + b[l -  a(U)I}, 
which simplifies, after manipulation, to 
In  region  2, in  which  individuals receive  a utility  supplement +,  the  no- 
shirking condition is 
(3)  w -  e + + = 8(w + +) + (1 -  S){(w  -  e + +)a(U)  + 
(P + +)[I  -  a(U)lI. 
The + terms cancel from both sides, leaving a wage equation 
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If b = p, equation (2)  is identical to equation (4), and the two regions have the 
same wage equation. The convexity of this wage curve follows from the con- 
vexity of the a(  U)  function and can be checked by differentiation. 
More intuitively, equilibrium necessitates that wages in each region be just 
enough to dissuade employees from shirking. This requires that the expected 
utility from shirking be no greater than that from working at effort e. Because 
the second region’s nonpecuniary attractions, +, are available to both the em- 
ployed and the unemployed, the condition for no shirking is independent of +. 
Thus, as long as there is no difference in unemployment benefit levels (or, more 
generally, the utility available to the jobless), each region has the same equation 
for its no-shirking condition. This common equation traces out a convex nega- 
tively sloped locus linking the wage, w,  to the unemployment rate, U.  When 
unemployment is low, for example, firms pay high wages to ensure that work- 
ers value their jobs sufficiently not to shirk. 
Proposition 4.2.  Assume that both regions have the same level of  unemployment 
benejit. (i)  Then,  for a zero-migration equilibrium, they must face direrent dis- 
tributions  of  demand  shocks  and  exhibit direrent wage/unemployment pat- 
terns. (ii)  Region I  has a higher expected wage than region 2. 
Pro05 For a zero-migration equilibrium, each region must offer the same level 
of expected utility to workers. The expected utility of a migrant into region 1 is 
(5) 
and of a migrant into region 2 is 
Given identical unemployment benefit levels b = p and identical distributions 
of demand  shocks g(*) = h(*),  these two expressions cannot be equal. The 
difference between them would be + >  0. In equilibrium, therefore, the regions 
must exhibit different wagehnemployment patterns, and this establishes the 
first part of the proposition. 
To  demonstrate that the expected wage in region  1 is higher than the ex- 
pected wage in region 2, it is necessary to prove that 
wg(s)ds >  mh(u)du. 
(7)  Ii 
Zero migration requires 
(8)  -  e)a(U) + b[l -  a(li?llg(s)ds =  ((0 -  e + +)ah)  I 
+ (P + +)[I -  4CL)llh(u)du. 165  International Wage Curves 
The two no-shirking conditions (one for each region) are 
(9)  w -  e = 6w + (1 -  6){a(U)(w -  e) + [l -  a(U)]b}, 
(10)  w -  e + + = 6(w + +) + (1 -  6){a(~)[w  + 4 -  el + 
r1 -  a(JL)I(P  + $11. 
Rearranging, and integrating both sides of each of these equations, 
e 
{a(p.)[w + + -  el + 
[1 -  a(ll.)l(P  + +)IhWdu. 
By equation (S), the left-hand sides of these must be equal: 
which simplifies, noting that the integral of eg/(  1 -  6) equals the integral of 
ehl(1 -  6), to 
wg(s)ds) -  wh(a)du = + > 0. 
(14)  II 
If proposition 4.2(i) were false, the two regions would have identical wage 
and unemployment outcomes. But, because region 2 is intrinsically attractive 
(it offers nonpecuniary benefit +), all workers would attempt to migrate there. 
In equilibrium,  therefore, region  2’s  attractions must be exactly counterbal- 
anced by inferior wage and unemployment combinations. 
To illustrate these ideas, figure 4.1 sketches wage curves. Curve I represents 
the locus along which occur the wage-unemployment combinations for regions 
with identical unemployment benefit levels. Repeated random shocks produce 
different  points  on  the  curve. To  ensure  a  zero-migration  equilibrium,  the 
intrinsically  more attractive region  2 must be characterized  more  often  by 
points in the southeast portion of the wage curve, which implies worse wage 
and unemployment combinations. Equilibria in the less attractive region 1 must 
more often occur in the northwest segment of the wage curve-so  that workers 
are willing to live there. This is captured algebraically in proposition 4.2(ii), 
which states that, because of  its inherent disadvantages, the first region must 
on average offer higher wages than region 2. Equation (14) shows that, in this 
world of risk-neutral people, the size of the regional gap in expected wages 
will equal the value of the nonpecuniary difference between the regions. 
Proposition 4.3.  Assume that the regions have different levels of unemployment 
bene$t.  Then the wage curve in the high-benefit region lies vertically above 
thut in the low-benefit region. 166  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
I  U 
unemployment 
Fig. 4.1  The wage curve 
Note:  Region I1 here has a higher level of unemployment benefit than region I 
Proot Because the no-shirking condition is 
the level of unemployment benefit, b, is a vertical shift parameter in a graph of 
the wage equation in wage/unemployment space. This result follows from the 
fact that the level of unemployment benefit (or value of full leisure) is an inter- 
cept variable in the no-shirking condition defining equilibrium. As would be 
expected intuitively, therefore, in a region with higher benefits to those who 
are unemployed, firms must set higher wage rates if they are to discourage 
shirking. 
Proposition 4.4. The results generalize  to models  with an arbitrary  number 
of regions. 
Proot A nonshirking condition will hold for each region. Mathematically, the 
separability of 4 in the wage equation ensures that, because an equivalent non- 
shirking condition can be written down for each area, the results generalize to 
an arbitrary number of regions. The heights of the different wage curves are 
determined by the size of the different unemployment benefit levels. 
An intuitive summary of the model's structure can be given in the following 
way. In this efficiency wage framework, a high level of regional unemployment 
is associated with a low level of regional wages: high unemployment makes 
employees keen to keep their jobs because it will be difficult to find another. 
Other things constant, therefore, these employees are reluctant to shirk at work, 
for fear they will be detected  and dismissed.  Knowing this, firms need pay 
only low wages to extract the required level of effort from workers. Fear of 
unemployment then disciplines workers. 167  International Wage Curves 
If unemployment is low, by contrast, employers have to offer high wages. If 
they do not, employees are likely to take the risk of shirking at work, realizing 
that it will be easy to find another job if dismissed. When the unemployment 
rate is low, high wage rates are necessary to motivate workers. 
Because individuals can eventually migrate, this is not the end of the story. 
First, although actual wage and unemployment combinations will depend on 
current demand  shock variables,  the average or expected  wage needs to be 
higher in regions with low nonpecuniary attractions. This is because regions 
have to offer equal expected utilities: otherwise some will get no workers will- 
ing to stay. Second, a region with a relatively high level of unemployment bene- 
fit will have a relatively high wage curve (such as the bold curve, labeled 11, in 
fig. 4.1). The intuitive reason for this is that, to ensure that there is no shirking 
in an area where the utility from being unemployed is relatively great, the em- 
ployer must pay better than in areas where the utility of the jobless is compara- 
tively low. It is more expensive to motivate workers  who have good outside 
options. Some regions thus have wage curves that lie vertically above those in 
other regions. 
Individuals do not all move to the regions with the highest wage curves or 
to the regions with the greatest nonpecuniary advantages because those two 
kinds of regions are areas that more commonly have wage and unemployment 
outcomes in the southeast segments of their own wage curves (i.e., worse re- 
cessions). Probabilistic demand shocks are thus an essential part of a coherent 
model. Put loosely, intrinsically attractive regions  with high unemployment 
benefits must be characterized, in steady-state equilibrium, by  harsher “busi- 
ness cycles” than less favored areas. 
According to this  multisector model, there can exist a downward-sloping 
convex function tying together the rate of unemployment in an area and the 
level of remuneration offered within that location. The intercept in this function 
depends on the size of the unemployment benefit so that regions have the same 
wage curve only if they do not differ in the generosity of  income paid to (or 
for exogenous reasons enjoyed by) those out of  work. 
The purpose of this section has been to offer one way of thinking about the 
empirical patterns found in the international microeconomic data.8 The com- 
mon empirical finding suggests that there is some systematic relation at work 
across the countries, and it is not easy to see how traditional models could 
account for it. However, in an efficiency wage framework with random demand 
shocks, there are reasons to believe that, just as the data show, pay and unem- 
ployment will be negatively  related. The model has demonstrated  why  it is 
8. At the NBER conference, Richard Freeman favored a “disequilibrium” explanation for the 
wage curve in which “demand shocks to areas raise wages and lower unemployment.” This is 
exactly the property of the theoretical model, except that we would not use the word disequilibrium 
because it evokes the idea that the wage curve is transitory. Demand shocks hit regions continu- 
ously-sliding  them left or right along a no-shirking condition. 168  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
misleading to expect a positive correlation between regional wage levels and 
unemployment levels. Because the aim has been to eschew competitive labor 
market theory, the analysis is necessarily unconventional. It may be that even- 
tually the conceptual framework developed here will be seen to be incomplete 
or misleading, but at this juncture a multisector efficiency wage model appears 
to have the right general properties to fit the facts. 
4.4  Conclusions 
This paper uses a number of microeconomic data sets to study the relation 
between the level of pay and the level of  unemployment. It attempts to demon- 
strate that there is an empirical regularity (a “wage curve”) in international pay 
and unemployment data, that different countries’ estimates of the unemploy- 
ment elasticity of  pay cluster at approximately  -0.1,  and that conventional 
wisdom  on U.S.  regional  wage-unemployment  patterns  needs  to be  recon- 
sidered. 
The paper presents evidence from eight countries for the existence of  an 
inverse relation between employees’ pay and the level of regional unemploy- 
ment and evidence from three countries for the existence of  an inverse relation 
between employees’ pay and the level of industry unernpl~yment.~  Estimates 
with and without controls for sectoral fixed effects are provided. In the case of 
the United States, it appears to be important to allow for regional fixed effects: 
doing so reverses the conventional view that area wages and area unemploy- 
ment rates are positively correlated. 
Although presented here as a kind of  statistical fact or uniformity  in the 
data, the estimated wage curve also corresponds to the key element in a new 
class of macroeconomic models. One example of this class is efficiency wage 
theory, in which unemployment acts as a discipline device that dissuades em- 
ployees from shirking on the job: a high unemployment rate allows the firm to 
pay less in equilibrium. The paper shows how this idea can be incorporated 
into a model of interregional equilibrium. Its predictions are different from, 
and in some cases almost the opposite of, those in the tradition of Harris and 
Todaro (1970) and Hall (1970, 1972). One reason is that this literature has not 
distinguished as clearly as it could have between, on the one hand, a positive 
regional correlation between expected pay and expected unemployment and, 
on the other, a negative regional correlation between contemporaneous pay and 
unemployment. 
The estimated wage curves imply that, averaging across nations, a doubling 
of local unemployment reduces the level of pay by approximately 10 percent.’O 
The size and quality of the international cross-sectional data sets vary, but, 
9. This does not mean that, as one commentator put it, the unemployment rate in countries with 
high real wages should be less than it is in those with low real wages or that secularly growing 
wages will lower unemployment. The model shows that richer countries have (vertically) higher 
wage curves. 
10. This holds true in U.S.  data after instrumenting unemployment. 169  International Wage Curves 
when taken together, the findings suggest that there is a common empirical 
pattern across nations. It seems that a satisfactory theory of  labor market be- 
havior needs to be able to account for the fact that international wage curves 
exist. 
Data Appendix 
British Social Attitudes Survey Series, 1983-91 
This series of surveys, core funding for which was provided by the Sainsbury 
Family Trusts, was designed to chart movements in a wide range of  social 
attitudes in Britain and is similar to the General Social Survey carried out by 
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in the United States. The sur- 
veys  were designed and collected by  Social and Community Planning Re- 
search (SCPR) and derive from annual cross-sectional surveys from a represen- 
tative sample of  adults aged eighteen or over living in private households in 
Great Britain whose addresses were on the electoral register. The first three 
surveys involved around eighteen hundred adults; the numbers were increased 
to three thousand in 1986. Interviews were also conducted in Northern Ireland 
for the first time in  1989. 
The sampling in each year involved a stratified multistage design with four 
separate stages of  selection. First, in each year, approximately 120 (150 in 
1986) parliamentary constituencies were selected, with the probability of  se- 
lection proportionate to the size of the electorate in the constituency. Then, for 
each constituency, a polling district was selected also with the probability of 
selection proportionate to the size of the electorate. Then thirty addresses were 
selected at a fixed interval on the electoral register. Finally, at each sampled 
address, the interviewer selected one respondent using a random selection pro- 
cedure (a Kish grid). The majority of sample errors for each survey lie in the 
range 1.0-1.5; errors for subgroups would be larger. For further details of the 
survey design, see, for example, Jowell, Witherspoon, and Brook (1991). 
The General Household Survey Series, 1973-77 
The General Household Survey is a continuous multipurpose national sam- 
ple survey based on private households selected from the electoral register. It 
originated in 1971 as a service to various government departments. Although 
there is substantial continuity in questions over time, new areas for questioning 
are introduced, for example, leisure in  1973 and 1977 and drinking in  1978, 
and the form of questions varies between years. 
The sample remained largely unchanged between 1971 and 1974 and was 
designed to be representative of Great Britain in each calendar quarter. The 
three-stage sample design involved the selection of  168 local authority areas 
as the primary sampling units (PSUs) by probability proportional to population 170  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
size, after first stratifying local authority areas by (a)  regions, (b)  conurbations, 
other urban  areas, semirural areas, and rural  areas, and (c) average ratable 
value. Each year, four wards (in rural areas, groups of parishes) are selected 
from each PSU with the probability proportional to the population size. The 
selected local authority areas are rotated in such a way  that a quarter are re- 
placed every three months. Within each ward, twenty or twenty-five addresses 
are selected. At most, three households are interviewed at each address (and, 
to compensate for additional households at an address, a corresponding num- 
ber are deleted from the interviewer’s address list). This yielded a total effective 
sample of  15,360 households in 1973, for example. 
Since 1975, in an attempt to reduce the effects of  clustering, the sample 
design has been based on a two-stage sampling procedure with electoral wards 
as the PSUs. Geographically contiguous wards or parishes are grouped where 
necessary  to provide  a minimum  electorate  of twenty-three hundred before 
selection. Wards are stratified by (a)  regions, (b)  metropolitan and nonmetro- 
politan  counties,  and  (c) percentage  in  higher  or  intermediate  nonmanual 
socioeconomic groups, to produce  168 strata. Within these strata, wards are 
listed by (d)  percentage of households in owner occupation, before being sys- 
tematically selected by probability proportional to size. Four wards are used 
from each stratum each year, with each selected ward in use for three years 
before being replaced. Selection of addresses within wards remains the same 
as before 1975, but addresses where there are multiple households are treated 
somewhat differently. The sample is not representative in each calendar quarter 
after 1975. 
Some households respond only partially; therefore, response rates can be 
measured in a number of different ways: 
1.  The minimum  response  rate,  defined  as only  completely  cooperating 
households-70  percent in 1973. 
2. The maximum response rate, which excludes only households where the 
whole household either refused or was not contacted-84  percent in 1973. 
3.  The middle response rate, which includes households where information 
is missing for certain questions but excludes those where information is miss- 
ing altogether for one or more household members-81  percent in 1973 (the 
middle response rate therefore includes the 6 percent [in 19731 of households 
in  which information  about one or more household  members  was obtained 
from  someone else in the household  [a “proxy”];  certain questions are not 
asked by proxy, e.g., questions about income, educational qualifications,  and 
opinion). 
The data set is based on individuals (i.e., all adults and children in the sam- 
ple households); that is, the case unit is an individual, not a household. The 
GHS defines a household as “a group of people living regularly at one address, 
who are all catered for by the same person for at least one meal a day.” 171  International Wage Curves 
The International Social Survey Series, 1985-89 
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a voluntary grouping 
of study teams in eleven nations (Australia, Austria, Britain, Holland, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Norway, and West Germany). In  1987, a separate Swiss 
survey was also included. As a condition of membership, each country under- 
takes to run a short, annual, self-completion survey containing an agreed-on 
set of questions asked of a probability-based, nationwide sample of adults. The 
topics change from year to year by agreement, with a view to replication every 
five years or so. The major advantage of the ISSP is that it produces a common 
set of questions asked in identical form in the participating countries. 
For a description of the technical details of  the surveys, see the technical 
appendix in Jowell, Witherspoon, and Brook (1989). 
The Current Population Surveys, 1964-88 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is the source of the official govem- 
ment statistics on employment and unemployment in the United States. The 
CPS has been conducted monthly for over forty years. Currently, about 56,500 
households are interviewed monthly, scientifically selected on the basis of area 
of  residence to represent the nation  as a whole, individual states, and other 
specified areas. Each household is interviewed once a month for four consecu- 
tive months in one year and again for the corresponding time period a year 
later. This technique enables month-to-month  and year-to-year comparisons to 
be obtained at a reasonable cost while minimizing the inconvenience to any 
one household. 
Although the main purpose of  the survey is to collect information on the 
employment situation, a secondary purpose  is to collect information on the 
demographic status of the population, information such as age, sex, race, mari- 
tal status, educational attainment, and family structure. From time to time, ad- 
ditional questions are included on such subjects as health, education, income, 
and previous  work experience. The statistics resulting from these questions 
serve to update similar information collected once every ten years through the 
decennial census and are used by policymakers and legislators as indicators of 
the economic situation in the United States and for planning and evaluating 
many government programs. 
The CPS provides current estimates of the economic status and activities of 
the population of the United States. Because it is not possible to develop one or 
two overall figures (such as the number of unemployed) that would adequately 
describe the whole complex of  labor market phenomena, the CPS is designed 
to provide a large amount of detailed and supplementary data. Such data are 
made available to meet a variety of needs on the part of users of labor market 
information. 
Thus, the CPS is the only source of monthly estimates of total employment 
(both farm and nonfarm); nonfarm self-employed persons, domestics, and un- 172  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
paid helpers in nonfarm family enterprises; wage and salary employees; and, 
finally, total unemployment. It provides the only available distribution of work- 
ers by the number of hours worked (as distinguished from aggregate or average 
hours for  an industry), permitting  separate analyses of  part-time workers, 
workers on overtime, etc. The survey is also the only comprehensive current 
source of information on the occupation of workers and the industries in which 
they work. Information is available from the survey not only for individuals 
currently in the labor force but also for those who are outside the labor force. 
The characteristics of such people-whether  married women with or without 
young children, disabled individuals, students, older retired workers, etc.- 
can be determined. Information on their current desire for work, their past 
work experience, and their intentions as to job seeking are also available. 
The March CPS, also known as the Annual Demographic File, contains the 
basic monthly demographic and labor force data described above plus addi- 
tional data on work experience, income, noncash benefits, and migration. 
The Korean Occupational Wage Surveys, 1983 and 1986 
The Occupational Wage Survey is conducted annually by  the Korean Minis- 
try of Labor. The survey includes wage, employment, and demographic infor- 
mation on about 5 million workers. The paper makes use of the original tapes 
with around 600,000 observations that are randomly sampled from the original 
survey. The sampling units are firms, not individuals. Firms report wage and 
demographic data on a random sample of  their workers, but only firms with 
ten or more employees are included in the survey. This omits roughly one-third 
of the nonagricultural workforce in a typical year. 
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